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Copyright and Home Taping: Old Rights in New Markets 
David Ladd 
n April 21, 1982, Senator Charles Mathias chaired 
hearings on his bill which would impose a levy on the 
sale price of recording equipment and blank tapes. The 
funds collected would be distributed to copyright owners in 
compensation for home video and audio recording of pro- 
tected works. Additionally, copyright owners of certain 
works would be given control over the commercial rental of 
their works to the public. Merely enumerating the hotly 
disputed contentions of the parties involved would con- 
sume pages. 
The Mathias Amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act 
represents, however, something more profound and cru- 
cial to our intellectual property policy than its particular 
solution to the home taping problem. It represents a bold 
and innovative legislative stroke directed at a fundamental 
and spreading problem in copyright; well-proportioned to 
its gravity. 
Barely six years have elapsed since Congress compre- 
hensively revised the old 1909 Copyright Law. Yet, such 
copyright issues as cable television, satellite signal 
"poaching," film and record piracy, computer programs, 
and home recording continue to crowd the legislative cal- 
endar. Clearly the 1976 revision, while settling a large 
number of copyright questions for the future, does not fully 
chart the course to accommodating authors' rights to new 
technologies. In fact, the day of Revisions with a capital "R" 
is over. From now on, the copyright law will be in a con- 
stant, rolling revision. 
The principles of compensating authors, in the service of 
both justice and utility, remain fixed. But technology is not 
fixed, and its rapid changes have wrought radical changes 
in how the author's creation reaches the author's public. 
In short, the change in copyright markets is caused by 
changes in technology, and is similarly awesome. 
The market environment which includes off-air taping is 
characterized by large-scale diffusion of reproduction and 
performance technologies, e.g., videorecording, removed 
from the control of a relatively small number of companies, 
e.g., movie studios, distributors and exhibitors, into the 
hands of millions of consumers. The number of potentially 
remunerative uses of protected works such as tape rentals 
and home recording, has increased dramatically and be- 
come impossible to detect and quantify. The absence of 
any privity between copyright owners and the ultimate 
users diminishes the role of contracts as the basic instru- 
ment of legal control in public distribution of works; the 
enforcement of copyright remedies, for the first time, ap- 
pears to clash with notions of privacy. Put simply, new 
technology threatens to undermine the reality of authors' 
rights, by making their administration and enforcement 
practically unworkable through traditional legal means. 
Opponents to the Mathias Amendment argue against 
proprietary claims for control and remuneration, claiming 
David Ladd is U.S. Register of Copyright. 
that the industries concerned are now making money, no 
financial losses can be proximately linked to the activities 
complained of, and extension of copyright controls to the 
new technological use is "proprietary aggrandizement." 
This line of argument rests upon two unfortunate fal- 
lacies: first, that copyright exists only to mitigate the eco- 
nomic harm to authors which would arise in its absence, 
and that the need for recognition of proprietary rights in the 
potential markets of post-industrial America is determin- 
able with reference to commercial profitability today. 
The first fallacy is easily disposed of: the purpose of 
copyright is found in the plain statement of Article I, sec. 8 
of the Constitution: "To promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries." Copyright, therefore, exists to 
achieve a positive social goal, utilizing private property and 
public tastes, however vulgar or refined. Through the copy- 
right owners' good business sense, yielding maximum 
returns on creations, and the consumers' cultural prefer- 
ences, investment in the creation of new works will expand 
with growing demand and will achieve their widest dis- 
semination. 
The second fallacy is harder to deal with, since the only 
hard information we have about the changes taking place 
are those which are before us today. It is in this respect, 
however, that the Mathias Amendment is an important 
model. Far from creating new rights, the amendment 
would preserve those which are well established, but now 
imperiled by the gradual collapse and reordering of im- 
portant markets. 
The videocassette renter, by making works available for 
home viewing, is performing a function now done by broad- 
casters or theaters. The law should take account of this 
a ~ d  impose liabilities analogous to those which govern 
broadcasters and theater owners. Similarly, where private 
individuals utilize technology to engage in reproduction 
activities which impinge upon potential markets for the 
sale, rental or controlled performance of works, account 
should be taken of this to ensure continued adequate 
incentive to invest in the creation of new works. 
The Mathias amendment is hardly perfect. It builds upon 
previous experience in compulsory licensing of certain 
performance rights, rather than leaving rate setting, collec- 
tion and distribution of royalties to private institutions. But 
until we can formulate ground rules to allow large scale 
collective licensing of copyrighted works, Senator Mathias' 
step is an important one. 
The success or failure of this effort will be closely 
watched, because the modalities involved will surely be 
raised in other high technology-copyright controversies. In 
such areas as computer usages, reprographic reproduc- 
tion, and the satellite-to-home "celestial juke-box," the 
question presented is whether we are imaginative enough 
to understand that as every theatre has a box office, every 
home must have its equivalent. & 
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A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 
Guido Calabresi 
T' he last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental change in American law. In this time we have gone 
from a legal system dominated by the common law, de- 
veloped by courts, to one in which statutes enacted by 
legislatures have become the primary source of law. The 
consequences of this "orgy of statute making", as Profes- 
sor Grant Gilmore has called it, are just beginning to be 
analyzed. 
One consequence is that we are increasingly being gov- 
erned by laws that remain in effect only because they were 
once enacted by legislatures, and not because they are 
wanted by a current majority. Bicameral legislatures, legis- 
lative committees, separation of executive and legislative 
branches of government, in fact all of our so-called "checks 
and balances," create inertia. And inertia means that even 
a small minority can often keep an existing law on the 
books, however much that statute becomes anachronistic. 
This fact, undesirable in itself, has been particularly galling 
to judges, and their responses to it have created problems 
at least as severe as those they sought to avoid. 
When most of our law was judge-made, it was relatively 
easy for judges to undercut rules that no longer made 
sense, that responded to needs that were no longer valid, 
that treated some people differently from others without a 
good present reason. The "great judges", whose deeds 
form the basis of many a first-year law school curriculum, 
were those who were able wisely, perhaps slowly but 
nonetheless effectively, to adapt the common law to the 
needs of their time, to keep the common law functional and 
up-to-date. The lesson the student-who later becomes a 
judge-inevitably learns, is that, in a system like ours, if the 
law is outdated, it is up to the judges to bring it into line. 
Yet at the same time the student learns another lesson 
-that statutes enacted by legislatures are not to be trifled 
with by courts. If they are constitutionally valid, they must 
be enforced. That is the essence of legislative supremacy. 
When statutes were few and far between judges could 
abide by both lessons without too much strain. They could 
keep the bulk of the law current by updating common law 
rules and still honor legislative supremacy. Today, doing 
both no longer seems possible. Faced with this dilemma, it 
is little wonder that the least willful of judges have re- 
sponded to their task with open aversion as they enforced 
timeworn interpretations of even more timeworn laws. 
Other judges have acted more aggressively and have 
used constitutions to strike down laws whose flaws were 
not that they violated fundamental rights but only that they 
had become inconsistent with the rest of our growing law. 
Guido Calabresi, Sterling Professor of Law at 
Yale University, is author of the recent book: A 
Common Law for the Age of Statutes; Harvard 
University Press, 1982. 
Still other judges have "interpreted" the dated statutes in 
ways which would make the proverbial Jesuit blush, in 
order to keep them current. 
Not surprisingly, as more and more judges have taken 
these last two roads, concern has increased. Holding a 
statute unconstitutional is very different from updating the 
common law. A bad common law ruling by a court can be 
reversed by the legislature. A constitutional decision goes 
a long way toward depriving the legislature of its last say. 
False or casuistic interpretations may seem less danger- 
ous since they can be reversed by legislatures. But they 
require judges to lie, and if fictions and lies become corn- 
mon judicial currency we lose all control over judges. Much 
current judicial activism, and much of the justified criticism 
it has aroused, can be traced to the rather desperate 
responses of our courts to obsolete statutes and to the 
manifest incapacity of our legislatures to keep such stat- 
utes up-to-date. 
What then are we to do? Legislative solutions, like sun- 
set laws, which would automatically repeal all statutes or 
regulations after a fixed number of years, are doomed to 
failure. They are too mechanical and would destroy laws 
that are still fit. If they were taken seriously, they would put 
the inertia inherent in our system of checks and balances 
at the disposal of those who want no laws. And this is just 
as bad as favoring, through inertia, those who benefit from 
dated laws. Delegation of the authority to update laws to 
administrative agencies has been tried and has been a 
disaster. We could, of course, abolish our checks and 
balances. Yet such a move seems fraught with danger. It 
was fear of real evils that led to the creation of checks and 
balances. Those evils remain real today. 
What is needed is a new approach-a form of judgmen- 
tal rather than automatic sunset. This would permit courts 
to induce legislative reconsideration of only those laws that 
are anachronistic. It would lead to a review of those stat- 
utes, whatever their chronological age, which, were they 
common law rules, would be overturned by courts doing 
their traditional job. Some techniques for doing this already 
exist; others could easily be developed. Such an approach 
would help legislatures keep the law current without under- 
mining those laws that, even if ancient, are still integral 
parts of our legal fabric, and without depriving legislatures 
of the final word in ordinary law-making. 
The ability of judges and courts to spot what does not fit 
the changing legal landscape was a significant source of 
their authority to update the common law. It is the reason 
they have, today, felt pushed to misinterpret statutes and to 
abuse constitutional adjudication, in order to make out- 
dated laws conform. It can become, if openly recognized 
and used to further legislative decisionmaking, the means 
by which we can retain both checks and balances and 
legislative supremacy while eliminating those statutes that 
are out-of-phase with the whole of our law and that are not 
demanded by a current majority. It can give rise to a com- 
mon law suited to our age of statutes. & 
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A Litany 
Harry A. Blackmun 
he Court is a special place from which to observe, for 
one has a view of all that is happening on constitu- 
tional issues in the courtrooms of America. One sees what 
people are litigating about, not only with each other but with 
their governments: federal, state, and municipal. One gets 
a sense of their desires and of their frustrations, of their 
hopes and of their disappointments, of their profound per- 
sonal concerns, and of what they regard as important and 
as crucial. The following is what I have seen. It is not all 
good, and it is not all bad: 
On the negative side are things that are also obvious to 
you. We see in our cases: 
1. The widespread drug problem with its consequent 
misery, its abandonment of moral standards, and its 
accompanying crime. 
2. The absence of safety in our streets, our parks, our 
homes, everywhere. 
3. The ever-present challenge to the basic guaran- 
tees set forth in the Bill of Rights, the constant attempt of 
government to impinge bit by bit upon those rights, an 
impingement sometimes occasioned by abuses in the 
assertion of those rights, senseless disregard and 
attack upon law enforcement officers, and vandalism 
everywhere. 
4. The pollution in every street, every public place, 
along the highways, in the natural waters we value so 
highly. 
5. The growing and seemingly insolvable needs of 
America-poverty-the unnecessary injury to life and 
body and property and the human spirit. 
6. What seems to be the gradual disappearance of 
private and parochial schools because of financial prob- 
lems, a decreasing supply of personnel, and the diffi- 
culty now to obtain significant public aid. 
7. The increasing dependence upon big government 
-the plight of the cities-the States' desperate efforts 
to keep solvent in the face of a widening need forwelfare 
even during periods of seeming affluence. 
8. The bigotry and hatred that flow from racial preju- 
dice. 
9. The changes in moral concepts-the public servic- 
ing of pornography and license-the ultimate accep- 
tance of the obscene and of the massage parlor-that 
bow in the direction of the inevitability of the lesser 
dimensions of human nature. 
10. The many new problems of the electronic age, sur- 
veillance and bugging, the pen register, unlicensed 
copying, record piracy. 
Harry A. Blackmun is Associate Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court. This litany is ex- 
cerpted from the Justice's 1981 Law Day Address 
1 1. The seemingly perpetual conflict over welfare- 
claimed inequality-the stark evidence of the welfare 
state in which we seem necessarily to live. 
12. The clamor over the gagging of the press-the 
tension between the First Amendment's guaranty of a 
free press and the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of a fair 
trial. 
13. The loss in individuals of the senses of personal 
obligation and of personal dependability. 
14. What some feel is the loss of America's moral lead- 
ership in the world at large, a decline, seemingly, in the 
integrity demands of the several professions, the failure 
of the church and of the schools and of the family to 
provide guidance. 
Yet on the positive side, we see: 
1. The constant application in American courts of the 
principles of the Bill of Rights, day by day without much 
noise or clamor. 
2. The increasing awareness and a broadening con- 
cept of individual rights and freedoms. 
3. The struggle with the media in connection with the 
invasion of privacy and with defamation under the guise 
of a free press. 
4. The recognition of rights of those in prison or on 
probation or parole. 
5. The recognition of rights of those in mental institu- 
tions. 
6. The continuing stress upon equality of educational 
opportunity. 
7.  The recognition of the presence of constitutional 
rights for school children. 
8. The long overdue revolution in the criminal law from 
my days in law school. 
9. An awareness of the value of our environment, and 
the constant pressure now to do something about it. 
10. The racial revolution. 
1 1. The voting revolution-one man, one vote-the 
elimination or lowering of durational residency require- 
ments. 
12. Broadening concepts of privacy, occasioned in part 
because of pressures of the press to invade, and in part 
because of the sexual revolution. 
13. A vast demand for and strengthening of ethical 
standards for the judiciary. 
14. A growing demand on the part of the public for 
performance and for integrity in public office and for a 
greater openness in the administration of government. 
And then we see some issues, emotional, always ago- 
nizing, and either positive or negative, depending on the 
point of view: the death penalty-reverse discrimination- 
abortion - affirmative action - inverse condemnation - 
limits upon commercial advertisina-~rofessional adver- 
I - .  at the University of Georgia School of Law. continued on page 6 
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Antitrust Enforcement in the 
Reagan Administration 
Earl W. Kintner 
uring the past year the media has given consider- 
able attention to so-called drastic changes in antitrust 
policy under the Reagan Administration. As a result, some 
companies and individuals have concluded that their busi- 
ness activities no longer need to be restrained by the 
antitrust laws. For a while this attitude became particularly 
prevalent with regard to mergers, and led, in the words of 
Sylvia Porter, to "merger mania." In part, top officials at the 
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission are to 
blame for the situation, since certain unfortunate state- 
ments by those officials were seized upon by a press corps 
all too willing to characterize the Reagan Administration as 
being weak in the area of antitrust enforcement. These 
officials subsequently disclaimed any intent to drastically 
alter most traditional antitrust concepts, but these state- 
ments received far less publicity. 
My conclusion is that the antitrust laws are continuing to 
be enforced and will be enforced in the Reagan Adminis- 
tration. Republican administrations traditionally have been 
strong supporters of the antitrust laws. Despite all the 
rhetoric, the Justice Department and Federal Trade Com- 
mission are continuing to vigorously prosecute hard core 
antitrust violations and mergers between significant com- 
petitors. While restrictions in the context of supplier- 
customer relationships, and mergers between non-com- 
petitors, will see reduced enforcement activity from the 
federal antitrust agencies, private plaintiffs and state at- 
torneys general will remain very active in these areas. 
Of special significance to business will be the Justice 
Department and FTC's development of a very active pro- 
gram of intervention before the ICC and other regulatory 
agencies, plus the antitrust agencies' plans to closely scru- 
tinize recently deregulated industries, such as transporta- 
tion, for antitrust violations. 
With respect to the hard-core antitrust violations-for 
example, agreements among competitors to fix prices, to 
divide territories or customers, or to engage in boycotts of 
competitors, suppliers or customers-the Reagan Admin- 
istration will be enforcing the antitrust laws as vigorously as 
they have ever been enforced. The Justice Department 
has made it clear that such activities are likely to be pros- 
ecuted criminally, that there will be a greater emphasis on 
indicting responsible individuals as well as their corpora- 
tions, and that prison sentences will be sought in almost all 
such cases. In recent years the courts have been increas- 
ingly supportive of the Justice Department's efforts to im- 
pose prison sentences for hard core antitrust violations. 
Earl W. Kintner, former General Counsel and 
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, is 
Senior Partner of Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & 
Kahn in Washington, D.C. 
In contrast, vertical arrangements-in other words, an 
arrangement between a supplier and its customer which 
restricts one party's freedom to set prices or select the 
persons with whom it will do business-will receive sig- 
nificantly reduced scrutiny under the Reagan Administra- 
tion. Under the previous Administration, both federal anti- 
trust agencies were extremely active in investigating and 
challenging vertical arrangements. The Justice Depart- 
ment even brought a criminal action against a manufactur- 
er's alleged restrictions on the prices at which its distribu- 
tors could resell its products. In contrast, Assistant At- 
torney General William Baxter, who heads the Justice 
Department's Antitrust Division, has been quoted as say- 
ing that the Antitrust Division will "seldom to almost never" 
bring a case involving vertical activity. The FTC may be 
somewhat more active in the area of vertical restraints, but 
the Commission's activity may be diminished from what it 
was in prior years. Nevertheless, private plaintiffs continue 
to bring vertical restraints cases, and the courts generally 
continue to view vertical restraints involving prices as per 
se unlawful, and to hold other types of vertical restraints 
illegal if they unreasonably restrain commerce. 
Probably the most publicized aspect of the Reagan Ad- 
ministration's antitrust policy has been with respect to 
mergers. Unfortunately, some heavily publicized state- 
ments by top Justice Department officials during the early 
months of the new Administration led to the erroneous 
belief in some quarters that the anti-merger statute would 
not be enforced by the Reagan Administration. While 
mergers involving firms which are not direct competitors 
are substantially less likely to be challenged than they 
were under prior administrations, the standards applicable 
to horizontal mergers (in other words, mergers between 
competitors) have not been changed significantly. For ex- 
ample. DuPont was reauired to eliminate a horizontal over- 
. . 
continued on page 7 
Blackmun continued from page 5 
tising-televised court proceedings-closure of criminal 
trials. 
And, finally, one has glimpses of what lies ahead-the 
problems that will present themselves as science takes us 
still farther into knowledge about life itself, as we learn 
more about extra-terrestrial regions and matter, as we 
develop the law of the Sea and the law of Space-all this in 
our relationships with others and within the framework of 
our Constitution. 
We see, in sum, what I think is a constant, seething, 
economic, domestic, ethical or, if you will, legal struggle. 
Yet I am not discouraged by it, for it all is, I believe, a 
striving among us as a people to evolve that which is right 
and that which is fair. Could we call it a struggle for Justice 
under a Rule of Law that must constantly be reaffirmed? & 
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Environmental Litigation: 
The Case for a Judicial Advisory Body 
Joel Yellin 
e intrinsic complexity of modern environmental con- 
troversies is at war with the notion of simple, feasible Th 
action upon which our theories of judicial review depend. 
Environmental cases present questions whose technical 
dimensions are foreign to judicial experience and educa- 
tion. They invite courts to formulate complex remedies that 
require long-term oversight. Moreover, the adversary pro- 
cess compounds the difficulties. It encourages the presen- 
tation of simplistic arguments that divert attention from the 
substance of environmental issues and sow confusion in 
the minds of generalist judges. 
That the environmental era has raised new and delicate 
problems for decisionmakers has not escaped notice. 
Regulatory reform is a constant presence on the legislative 
agenda, and over the last decade the establishment of 
advisory bodies for improving technological decisions by 
Congress and the Executive has proceeded apace. De- 
tailed study of major cases has convinced me that the 
judiciary has an important role to play in assuring the 
quality of environmental decisions. To paraphrase then- 
Professor Frankfurter, science and technology cannot re- 
shape society while the traditional boundaries of the legal 
process are maintained. In my view the critical ingredient 
the judicial system can supply is effective cooperation 
among the engineering, scientific, and legal communities. 
Joel Yellin is Associate Professor of Environrnen- 
tal Science and Law at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
Cooperation of that kind can be encouraged by estab- 
lishing, on a trial basis, a committee of standing masters- 
preferably trained in appropriate fields of science and law 
-available to the appellate courts in controversies involv- 
ing complex scientific and engineering questions. This 
would not be a major break with accepted practices. It is 
settled law that courts may submit complex questions to 
masters, even without the consent of litigants. I suggest 
the proceedings before such a committee be split into two 
stages. In stage one the committee would act as masters 
ordinarily do, reporting on technical questions formulated 
by the referring court-questions the court feels are separ- 
able from legal issues and necessary to resolve the instant 
controversy. Stage two proceedings would be novel. The 
committee would consider the whole case informally. It 
would not confine itself to the record, but would draw as it 
chose upon the relevant experts and technical literature. It 
should not be supposed that such proceedings would en- 
able precise resolutions of controversies over standards 
for air and water quality or for public exposure to low levels 
of ionizing radiation. Given the mix of ethics, law and 
science that these issues present, precise answers are not 
possible. What such a process can do is mutually to edu- 
cate the masters and the referring court, and through them 
the technical and legal communities, about the interrelated 
scientific, technological and legal problems that increas- 
ingly characterize environmental litigation. 
Such a proposal raises obvious questions. Would the 
masters' proceedings derogate the rights of litigants? 
Would they lengthen the legal process and increase 
continued on page 75 
Kintner continued from page 6 
lap before it was allowed to acquire Conoco, and Mobil's 
attempted acquisition of Marathon was challenged by the 
FTC. Several less publicized horizontal mergers have 
been challenged as well. 
The Justice Department is developing revised merger 
guidelines which should eliminate some of the present 
uncertainty in the merger area. While the guidelines may 
introduce new methods for measuring the competitive 
effect of a merger, and add more factors to the equation, I 
predict that the bottom line will not be changed drastically 
-mergers which involve substantial competitors will re- 
main prime candidates for antitrust challenges. Business- 
men and their legal counsel must also keep in mind that 
private plaintiffs and the courts will not be restrained by the 
new guidelines. As the Mobil-Marathon litigation demon- 
strates, private enforcement of the merger laws can be as 
effective as governmental actions. 
Just as the Reagan Administration's changes in merger 
policy have proven to be much less than some predicted, 
so too are the funeral notices for the FTC an overstate- 
ment. While the Federal Trade Commission has come 
under intense criticism from some segments of business 
and has taken some lumps during the Congressional ap- 
propriations process, I predict that the Commission will 
remain a strong, viable enforcement agency. As an inde- 
pendent regulatory agency, the Commission is in essence 
an arm of Congress. In the past, Congress has protected 
the agency from Administration initiatives which could 
have seriously affected the Commission's enforcement 
abilities. In particular, Congress has insisted upon con- 
tinued funding of the Commission's regional offices and 
has dampened initiatives to remove the Commission's 
antitrust enforcement authority. Congress is now gearing 
up to renew the Commission's funding authorization. In 
coming months we undoubtedly will hear a lot of additional 
complaints about the Commission's activities and there 
will be calls for the Commission's demise. However, I 
predict continued Congressional support for the Commis- 
sion's traditional enforcement missions, although Con- 
gress may block certain specific Commission actions as it 
did in 1980. 68 
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The Administration's Commitment 
to Law Enforcement 
Edwin Meese 
his is a time of great public concern about the prob- 
lems of crime. One paragraph from an article in The 
New York Times symbolizes the problems, as it states the 
following: 
Crime is up, but arrests are down. The police cite a 
lack of personnel. Prosecutors and courts are unable 
to cope with the numerous cases before them so they 
bargain for guilty pleas to flush all but the most seri- 
ous cases through the system as quickly as possible. 
Local jails and state prisons have run out of space to 
hold sentenced criminals. The probation department 
reports it's unable to supervise properly. Thousands 
of the law breakers in its custody leaving them essen- 
tially unpenalized for their acts. 
The article sums up that "these factors combined have 
worsened an already severe problem, for the less likely it 
appears that a person will be punished for a crime, the 
more likely he is to attempt one." 
The article does not provide information that is new, as 
anyone involved in the field of criminal law knows, and yet it 
does pose the problem for us. The situation is getting 
worse, the facilities are getting more meager, the money is 
not available in many places. It is in this context that the 
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has said 
that we really do need to take important steps to bring 
about a return to a more orderly society and to literally 
salvage the criminal justice system. 
If there's any priority of government next to defending us 
against external enemies, it is certainly to defend the law 
abiding citizens of this country against those who would 
prey upon their fellow man. 
At this point we would hope to clearly define the role of 
the federal government, a role which has been somewhat 
diffused over the past ten years, as to its responsibility for 
the crime problem. The federal government has a role, but 
that role is a limited one and it should be recognized as 
such. I am sure that many members of the bar hope that 
the federal government will restore LEAA, will have billions 
of dollars ready to pour out on state and local governments 
to continue the fight against crime, and that a beneficial 
federal administration will fund all the things they want to 
have accomplished in the next few years. Nonetheless, the 
facts of life of federal fiscal policy and the situation the 
administration found itself in on the 20th of January 1981 
makes a promise of such action impossible. 
- 
Edwin Meese is Counselor to the President. This 
article is adapted from the Counselor's August 1981 
speech before the American Bar Association. 
Even if that promise could be made, it may not be a good 
one. In the decade when federal funds were more readily 
available to local governments there was a blurring of the 
lines of authority and a vast increase in paper while there 
was no material decrease in the crime rate. Although there 
were some improvements in the ability of society to handle 
the crime problem, those improvements were not nearly 
proportionate to the amount of additional money that was 
poured into the system. 
It is very unlikely that there will be large amounts of 
federal funds available to state and local governments for 
the fight against crime. The economic recovery program 
has made it mandatory that we impose fiscal and budget- 
ary controls on the federal government. We think in the 
long run there will be an impact on the crime problem 
because the recovery of the economy is one of the factors 
that will shape a society in which some of the conditions 
that contribute to crime will be lessened. In order to meet 
our commitment to a balanced budget by 1984, it is neces- 
sary to constrain the growth of the federal government in 
each of the next two fiscal years so that we can achieve the 
goal of lessening inflation. But the federal government 
does have a role in crime abatement and this is a role that 
will contribute to and support state and local law enforce- 
ment authorities in their work against the criminal activity 
that plagues our cities. First of all, the federal government 
has a definite role which we wish to expand and improve in 
the field of narcotic and drug enforcement. The federal 
government is the only law enforcement level with the 
ability and the responsibility to stop the flow of drugs into 
this country, and it is a responsibility that has not in the past 
been carried out as effectively and as extensively as it 
should have been. This is one of the priorities of the ad- 
ministration, to utilize all of the resources of government 
and new resources that have not been tapped in order to 
interrupt this flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs across 
the borders. 
A second area where the federal government has to be 
of help is in the area of prisons and jails. If you had to 
isolate one problem in the criminal justice system right 
now, it's the shortage of prison and jail space. As a result of 
the Attorney General's efforts, and the rest of us interested 
in this field, the Secretary of Defense is now inventorying 
all of the unused military installations around the country to 
see what facilities might be made available to state and 
local governments. We have already found fully developed 
prison facilities and fully developed military jails which are 
unused at the present time. The administration hopes to be 
able to make these facilities available to state and local 
governments so that they can utilize them either on a 
continued on page 15 
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Providing Legal Sewices to the Poor 
Wm. Reece Smith, Jr. 
istory teaches us that since the dawn of civilization, 
mankind has sought justice. Justice is, of course, 
not solely a matter of law; it is the aim of many institutions 
-religious, social and economic. But in the Anglo-Ameri- 
can tradition, law has always been a major preserve of 
justice, and equality under the law an essential element of 
justice. The Magna Carta provides: "To no one will we sell, 
to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice." 
But the' promise made at Runnymede seven centuries 
ago still awaits fulfillment. Our forefathers on this continent 
-the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights- 
sought to establish justice by securing inalienable rights to 
which we are all entitled by law. The challenge we face 
today, especially those of us who are lawyers, is to assure 
that every American, whether rich or poor, has access to 
the legal system which preserves and safeguards these 
rights. 
The private bar in the United States has an abiding 
tradition of, and strong commitment to, public service. And 
there is no facet of our public service obligation that is more 
important than our responsibility to help meet the legal 
needs of the disadvantaged. Since the early beginnings of 
the legal aid movement over a century ago, generations 
of American lawyers have served the cause of the poor. 
The legal profession can be justly proud of this history of 
service. 
But as our nation has grown, so have the legal needs of 
the poor. The affairs of human society have become more 
and more complex for everyone. Not without justification, 
the complaint is often heard that one can hardly move in 
daily routine without encountering law and lawyers. As the 
authority of other institutions has waned, that of the law has 
grown. More than ever in our history, access to justice has 
come to depend on access to law. Because of these 
developments, the legal needs of the poor have proved 
simply too great for the private bar to serve alone. 
With the advent of publicly funded programs such as the 
Legal Services Corporation, we have made progress in 
meeting these needs. The Corporation has provided geo- 
graphic uniformity of legal services and a corps of workers 
skilled in poverty law. It has afforded the administrative 
framework essential to any effective delivery system. By 
coordinating Corporation programs with organized volun- 
tary legal aid, we have made remarkable strides in serving 
the poor throughout the country. The effort has proved an 
excellent example of the private sector and government 
working together to solve society's problems. 
Unfortunately, the Corporation is now in danger. It has 
been politically controversial and the subject of criticism 
for perceived abuses. Proposed legislation has been de- 
signed to foreclose every possible excess. Given these 
changes, it is difficult to see how any American who be- 
lieves in equal justice could oppose the Corporation's con- 
tinuation. 
It must be remembered that inadequate legal services 
for the poor is a national problem. Its causes run deep 
throughout the structure of society. And because the prob- 
lem is a societal one, responsibility for its solution must lie, 
in part, with society as a whole. Publicly funded legal 
services are a means of fulfilling that societal responsi- 
bility. Their existence is an affirmation of our national com- 
mitment to equal justice for all. 
Whether or not the Corporation survives, the need for 
private bar commitment to help the poor will be great. Even 
with the Corporation's present funding level, the needs of 
millions remain unserved. If the Corporation dies or is 
weakened, these numbers will increase. Though we have 
long realized that we cannot do the job alone, we lawyers 
have a special obligation to help the poor through pro bono 
representation. Better than most, we understand that ac- 
cess to legal advice and representation is essential to the 
exercise of the rights and privileges of citizenship. Better 
than most, we know the impact of government and law on 
the poor. And better than most, we are equipped, by edu- 
cation and experience, to provide help where it is needed. 
As lawyers, we have long proclaimed that we are mem- 
bers of a learned profession with an ethical duty to serve 
the poor. We are also aware that change abounds today in 
our profession. Trends in our attitudes and practices and in 
the ways we are regulated seem to threaten to reduce a 
learned profession to a mere commercial enterprise. We 
must remember that the central issue is not whether we 
change some of our practices or even whether we are 
subject to new modes of regulation, but whether we con- 
tinue to strengthen our commitment to the highest goals of 
public service. 
There is much at stake. Whatever the fate of publicly 
funded programs, the fulfillment of our duty to serve the 
poor will be crucial for the proper functioning of our society. 
Learned Hand said that if we are to keep our democracy, 
we must honor one commandment: "Thou shalt not ration 
justice." It is time for us to embrace this commandment 
anew and fulfill the promise of the Magna Carta. Seven 
centuries have been long enough to wait. &B 
Wm. Reece Smith, Jr., Immediate Past Presi- 
dent of the American Bar Association, is a Partner 
of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cu- 
tler, in Tampa, Florida. 
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Lawyer4lient Confidentiality and the 
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Robert J. Kutak 
n early August the American Bar Association's House of 
Delegates will formally debate the merits of the pro- 
posed Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model 
Rules are intended to replace the 1969 Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, the ABA's official recom- 
mended code of ethics for lawyers, which has been adopt- 
ed, with sometimes significant variations, by virtually every 
American jurisdiction. 
The Model Rules are a comprehensive reformulation of 
the law of lawyering, covering a wide range of subjects. 
Scholarly reviews of the proposed Final Draft, which have 
begun to appear since that draft's publication in May of 
1981, have generally been favorable. But the Rules have 
not been without controversy. 
A great volume of comment, both favorable and not, was 
generated by an earlier Discussion Draft released in Janu- 
ary, 1980. While many changes were made in the text 
between the Discussion Draft and Final Draft, substantial 
controversy seems still to exist with regard to the Model 
Rules' treatment of the confidential nature of the client- 
lawyer relationship. It is important, therefore, to focus on 
the precise language of the Final Draft as proposed to the 
House of Delegates, for the drafting task has been a long 
one and many revisions and refinements in the text have 
been made. 
The Model Rules do not regard either the evidentiary 
privilege of confidentiality or the ethical principle of confi- 
dentiality to be absolute. In this, the Rules agree with the 
current Model Code of Professional Responsibility, with its 
predecessor, the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with 
virtually every scholar and court that has considered the 
matter. 
In keeping with the underlying philosophy of the project, 
however, the Rules eschew the approach of previous 
statements on professional conduct whereby inherently 
conflicting obligations such as client confidentiality and 
candor to the courts were simply baldly stated. Those 
duties interact and compete for the attention of lawyers. In 
the context of confidentiality and a client's future crimes or 
frauds, the competing duties are particularly excruciating 
for conscientious lawyers and judges. 
Robert J. Kutak, Chairman of the American Bar 
Association Commission on Evaluation of Profes- 
sional Standards, is Presiding Partner of Kutak, 
Rock & Huie in Omaha. Nebraska. 
Agency law, criminal law, tort law, constitutional law-all 
have something to say on this subject. We believe the 
Model Rules fairly reflect the teaching of those other bod- 
ies of law. Specifically, the Rules recognize a limited dis- 
cretion for a lawyer to disclose otherwise confidential infor- 
mation to the extent necessary to prevent a client's future 
crime or fraud that is likely to result in death, serious bodily 
harm or substantial economic injury to another (Rule 1.6(b) 
(2) ). 
Similarly, law outside of legal ethics has a great deal to 
say about complicity in illegal or fraudulent conduct. 
Accordingly, the Rules recognize a limited discretion to 
disclose confidences to the extent necessary to rectify the 
consequences of a crime or fraud in the commission of 
which a lawyer's services had been used (Rule 1.6(b)(3)). 
This dimension of personal involvement of the lawyer 
also accounts in the Rules for the rare instances of re- 
quired disclosure: namely, the duty to disclose to a court 
corrective information in the event the lawyer comes to 
know that material evidence offered by him is in fact false 
(Rule 3.3(a)(4)). This flows from the lawyer's obligation not 
to make false statements of material fact or law to a court 
(Rule 3.3(a)(l)). Likewise, under the Model Rules, a law- 
yer may not knowingly permit a fraud to be perpetrated on 
a court if a disclosure of fact by the lawyer could prevent 
such a fraud (Rule 3.3(a)(2)). All this is clearly subject to 
any constitutional limits which may develop with regard to 
criminal proceedings. 
Outside the courtroom, a lawyer likewise may not make 
false statements of material fact nor, under the Rules, may 
a lawyer assist a crime or fraud even if disclosure of client 
information is necessary to avoid such assistance (Rule 
4.1). 
I restate the essence of the confidentiality rules at some 
length, for I believe that such a review of their content 
reveals that the principles they explicate are neither radical 
nor new. In fact, these principles and the Model Rules are 
more truly protective of what Justice White has called "our 
modified adversary system" than are other more absolutist 
views of confidentiality as are occasionally advanced or, 
at the other extreme, more disclosure-oriented views. A 
proper understanding of confidentiality by both lawyers 
and clients should place the client-lawyer relationship on a 
solid footing, preventing the client from being misled or left 
unprotected as a result of incorrect expectations. 
In miniature, the discussion of confidentiality has reca- 
pitulated much of the larger debate over all the provisions 
of the Model Rules. In reviewing that debate, it is clear that 
the Model Rules may indeed not comport with what some 
would believe professional lore teaches about our craft, 
but they comport with law. And there are those of us 
who believe that to be a higher goal and a harder one to 
achieve. &g 
Summer 1982 11 The Fine Print 
Adventure in Collectivism: The Kutak Rules 
Theodore I. Koskoff 
he "final" Kutak Rules offered the House of Dele- 
gates of the ABA in Chicago last winter remind one of 
Professor Fred Rodell's bon mot about law reviews. He 
said that there were only two things he did not like about 
most law review articles: one was the form and the other 
was the substance. 
Shorn of all their footnotes, the Kutak Rules do not use a 
synergism of form and substance to bore its readers. But 
they probably will confuse you, even if you have been 
paying very close attention to the last three years of debate 
about the rules of lawyers' conduct. And they will do so, in 
great part, because their form seems to have been chosen 
to conceal what they say, rather than to make it clear. 
I am referring, of course, to the Kutak Commission's 
decision to replace the Code of Professional Responsi- 
bility with a completely new format, with a completely new 
name. That decision has been affirmed by the House of 
Delegates of the A.B.A. The A.B.A. is going to try to get all 
of us to switch from the Code, which our state courts 
adopted during the seventies, to the Rules of Professional 
Conduct which Mr. Kutak has described as "Ethical Stan- 
dards for the Eighties and Beyond." (7 ABAJ 116 (9/81)). 
Not one rationale or alleged improvement that the Kutak 
Commission has given for changing from the present Code 
to the Kutak Rules would not have been equally applicable 
to an intelligent revision of the Code effected by competent 
drafting. 
The Commission tried to make us think this was not so 
by purporting to publish its proposed Rules both in its own 
format, and in the format of the present Code. The New 
York State Bar Association accurately described that 
Alternative Draft as "no more than patchwork" and not "a 
serious attempt to adapt the substantive content of the 
Model Rules to the . . . format" of the Model Code. 
Why did the Kutak Commission go to the trouble of 
producing and widely distributing a 360-page volume, pur- 
porting to show us that its work cannot be accommodated 
in the present Code? The phony and fallacious nature of 
this demonstration was quickly shown by the National 
Organization of Bar Counsel, which managed to do in 60 
pages what the Commission could not do in 360. Why did 
the Kutak Commission engage in this caper of intellectual 
deceit? Just to sell us a format? 
Everyone knows that form and substance are not readily 
separated. You cannot tell the dancer from the dance, as 
Yeats put it. It is not form that the Kutak Commission is 
trying to put over on us, but substance. What substance? 
Theodore I. Koskoff, Founder and Chairman of 
the National Board of Trial Advocacy and Immedi- 
ate Past President of the American Trial Lawyers 
Association, is a partner of Koskoff, Koskoff, and 
Under the guise of enlarging the attorney-client privi- 
lege, the Kutak Rules destroy that privilege. For example, 
Kutak Rule 3.3 requires lawyers to disclose information 
otherwise confidential under Rule 1.6. Entitled "Candor 
Toward the Tribunal," it requires disclosure whenever you 
know that non-disclosure is the equivalent to material mis- 
representation; whenever you know that not speaking up 
will result in "a fraud on the tribunal;" and whenever you 
discover that you have, however inadvertently, offered 
material evidence that you come to know is "false." This, 
as well as other "blowing the whistle" provisions, is an 
adventure into collectivism. 
The heart of the matter is where the lawyer's obligation 
to the client comes in conflict with the duty to the tribunal, 
where both candor and confidentiality cannot co-exist. The 
ABA's Ethics Committee has consistently held, under both 
the present Code and the old Canons of Ethics, that the 
client comes first. Almost all American authorities on legal 
ethics have agreed, going back to Judge Sharswood, the 
American doyen in the field, in 1854. 
The Kutak Commission thinks it has avoided the prob- 
lem of forcing the lawyer to incriminate the client by this 
clause, which it adds to the end of its Rule 3.3: 
CAVEAT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEFINING THE 
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
CRIMINAL CASES MAY SUPERSEDE THE 
OBLIGATIONS STATED IN THIS RULE. 
It is not just in criminal cases that we find this conflict 
between candor and confidence, and the constitutional 
problem is not just a Sixth-Amendment one. Quite obvi- 
ously, it is also a Fifth Amendment problem; placing an 
obligation of candor on the lawyer really makes the client 
incriminate himself, by proxy. In Upjohn, Inc. v. U.S., 499 
U.S. 383 (1981), a unanimous Supreme Court held that 
attorney-client confidentiality, at common law, is broader 
than, and independent of, the attorney-client privilege or 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 
We know that the Framers assumed a confidential attor- 
ney-client relationship when they wrote the Bill of Rights. 
The Constitution sees the lawyer as the client's champion 
against a hostile world. It is so basic, and so obvious a 
premise of the adversary system, which is itself an unar- 
ticulated premise of the Constitution, that the Framers did 
not think they had to spell it out. Inherent in both the 
"assistance of counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amend- 
ment, and the privilege against self-incrimination, guaran- 
teed by the Fifth, is that something told a lawyer can not be 
learned from the lawyer, if it can not be learned from the 
client. If the Kutak Rules were as constitutional as Mr. 
Kutak claims they are, they would show it in their treatment 
of confidentiality. They are, unhappily, a step backward 
from the Model Code. 
The Kutak Commission asks us to commit a betrayal of 
I Bieder in Bridgeport, Connecticut. continued on page 12 
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Reining in the Regulators 
Independent Regulatory Commissions Assessed 
Stuart M. Statler 
here is a hybrid out on the political landscape which 
has elements of all three branches of government. It 
has some legislative powers of the Congress. It enforces 
laws like the executive branch. It exercises certain judicial 
powers of the courts. Yet on a day-to-day basis, the inde- 
I 
pendent regulatory commission works outside the control 
of any of those branches. 
There are about a dozen such independent commis- 
sions.' Probably no other creation of Congress has caused 
so much debate-nor so much consternation amongst 
constitutional scholars. In a period of regulatory reform 
and streamlining of government, few areas warrant closer 
scrutiny than this so-called "fourth branch" of government: 
independence from whom and for what purpose? The 
underlying theory was enlightened; but changing eco- 
nomic and political circumstances can make even bold 
ideas obsolete. Through the years, particularly in the last 
decade, the vaunted independence of these agencies has 
been diluted. Today, one must question the continued 
value of independence when viewed against a growing 
public mandate for more efficient, coordinated, and less 
burdensome government. Instead of relying on the theory 
of how independent regulatory commissions should per- 
form, we can now look to experience to judge how they do 
perform. These commissions have major economic im- 
pacts, and they function beyond the control of our national 
leadership. 
'~hese independent regulatory commissions include the: Civil 
Aeronautics Board, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. Federal Communications Commis- 
sion, Federal Election Commission, Federal Maritime Commis- 
sion, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Trade Commission. Inter- 
state Commerce Commission, National Labor Relations Board, 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Securities and Ex- 
change Commission. 
Stuart M. Statler, a Commissioner of the Con- 
sumer Product Safety Commission, served as Act- 
ing Chairman from February 1981 through May 
1981. Commissioner Statler was former Chief 
Minority Counsel to a subcommittee of the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. 
Steven J. Buckley co-authored this article while Special 
Assistant to Commissioner Statler. 
HISTORY OF "INDEPENDENCE" 
The first independent regulatory commission was the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Established in 1887, 
the ICC was not strictly independent; it was part of the 
Department of the Interior. In fact, the term "indepen- 
dence" does not even appear in the legislative debate 
about the ICC. Most of that debate focused on the collegial 
structure-a group of co-equal commissioners using 
majority vote to determine policy. The issue of indepen- 
dence was first raised in 1889. The concern of a Rep- 
resentative Reagan (D-Texas) about the possible ad- 
verse effects of President Harrison's influence on the Com- 
mission led to a bill conferring full independence on the 
ICC. A man by the name of Reagan distrusted a sitting 
president, and we ended up with a constitutional curiosity. 
Today, "independence" might confuse more than 
describe. All independent agencies are run by commis- 
sions. Commissioners are appointed for a set term of 
office, can be removed only for cause, and operate outside 
of executive control. For example, the five commissioners 
of the Consumer Product Safety Commission serve for 
seven-year terms and may be removed only for "neglect of 
duty or malfeasance in office." The decision-maker, once 
appointed, does not depend on any political event or indi- 
vidual politician, not even the President, for continuance in 
office (although, in almost every case, an incoming ad- 
ministration can name its own chairman). 
continued on page 13 
Koskoff continued from page I I 
trust. It may not seem that way to the Commission, be- 
cause its members' clients are mostly corporations and, as 
their proposed Rules tell us, a lawyer for a corporation 
serves the corporate entity, and not any particular person. 
Perhaps to a lawyer whose clients are abstractions, ab- 
stract truth is a higher value than loyalty to legal fictions. If 
your vision of the American lawyer is that of "just a privately 
employed bureaucrat," you naturally define the lawyer as 
Kutak does-first, "an officer of the legal system," and only 
secondly "a representative of clients." 
We are not just part of the system, to be defined in such 
dull milk-and-water terms. We are part of the very life blood 
of American democracy. As Justice Story stated, lawyers 
are the "sentinels on the outposts of the Constitution." That 
is our highest function. 
I would rather work from a Code that was written in the 
sixties, and that breathes the spirit of that decade. There 
are things in that Code that make me proud to be a lawyer. I 
do not find them in the Kutak Rules. Kutak's proposal 
should be rejected. @J 
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Why so much latitude? Congress meant to insulate 
these commissioners from partisan considerations and 
ensure that they not reflect only the views of a particular 
administration. Of the more than one hundred federal 
regulatory agencies, very few enjoy this measure of auton- 
omy. The bulk, instead, are executive branch agencies 
contained within the various Cabinet departments, and 
answer ultimately to the President. Some are highly visible 
and semi-autonomous; others are buried in the bowels of 
bureaucracy. Almost all are headed by a single adminis- 
trator who is accountable to the department secretary. All 
administrators serve at the pleasure of the President and 
may be removed at any time for any reason. 
The Environmental Protection Agency is sometimes 
wrongly termed an "independent" agency in the executive 
branch because it is not part of a Cabinet department. But 
being "separate" is not the same as being "independent." 
The administrator of EPA has no job security-like the 
heads of other executive branch agencies, he or she can 
be fired at the whim of the President. The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission is a true curiosity: its commission- 
ers have set terms of office with removal only for cause, yet 
the agency is wholly contained within the Energy Depart- 
ment. 
Given the confusion about "independence," critics and 
proponents are often not talking about the same thing. The 
focus here is on the dozen or so commissions whose 
members have set terms and job security. Theory tells us 
that commissioners in these agencies can discharge their 
duties without fear of being tossed out for a politically 
unpopular decision. 
PROS AND CONS 
Political Taint. Independence insulates decision-makers 
from the more pernicious influences associated with poli- 
tics. We have certain assurances that a securities investi- 
gation will not be compromised because it involves a large 
campaign contributor; that a television license will not be 
awarded arbitrarily to the President's friend. Further, 
requirements for open meetings allow all to review the 
decision and satisfy themselves of its fairness and com- 
pleteness. In theory, commissions are havens for good- 
willed experts to make objective decisions about difficult 
policy issues without favoritism or fear of personal reprisal. 
But some critics view this structure as undemocratic. Com- 
missioners get together and decide what people and com- 
panies can and cannot do in such areas as transportation, 
trade, securities, communications, and banking. By grant- 
ing or denying a license, rate, or route, or prohibiting cer- 
tain commercial practices or banning specific products, 
they can make or break a business. Some contend that 
independent commissions are just not accountable to 
anyone-the White House, the Congress, regulated firms 
or the American public. That overstates the case, but there 
is some merit to the point. 
Moreover, the most immediate failing of independence 
stems from its arbitrary application. No theory guides us 
regarding when a particular area should be regulated by 
an independent body. Why do so few of the more than one 
hundred regulatory bodies merit such independence? 
Why should some types of regulation be promulgated 
by independent commissions while others are subject to 
White House influence or control? For instance, in the 
health and safety field the CPSC and NRC are indepen- 
dent, but every other health and safety agency-FDA, 
OSHA, EPA, NHTSA, FAA, FHA and the FSQS-is not.' 
The independentldependent split is not based on eco- 
nomics in that the NHTSA and EPA have far greater eco- 
nomic impacts than CPSC. Nor is the split based on some 
fuzzy notion of regulatory zeal. Few businessmen would 
argue that OSHA, a "non-independent" agency, has been 
noticeably restrained in exercising its powers. There is 
neither rhyme nor reason in who gets independence and 
who does not. 
Instant Rewrite. The independent commissions do not 
suffer from "instant rewrite" of regulations by a new ad- 
ministration, which executive agencies may encounter. 
Regardless of the merits of such actions, agencies smart 
under such blows to their integrity. By contrast, if the Presi- 
dent wanted to redirect an independent agency's path, he 
could so do only through legislation or by persuading-but 
not ordering-the commission to revise regulations. The 
agency cannot be directed to change a decision nor can 
the commissioners be fired if they choose not to. 
Many regulations, however, should be rewritten. . . or 
rescinded. On some issues, commissioners are out 
of touch with everyday public sentiment: bureaucratic 
myopia can produce poor regulations and bureaucratic 
inertia can keep them alive. Even when a commission 
decides to revise specific rules, lengthy delays are com- 
monplace. Procedural roadblocks abound; and special 
interests (be they fervent public interest advocates or busi- 
nessmen concerned about "unfair competition") ingen- 
iously exploit these loopholes. 
Policy Consistency. Election results will not dictate dra- 
matic shifts in policy within the independent regulatory 
commissions. Both industry and the public can bank on 
some constancy, and be certain the rules of the game will 
not change in mid-course. Naturally, the independent com- 
missions will to some degree reflect the changing political 
climate. An incoming administration can appoint a new 
chairman and fill vacancies as they arise, especially at the 
start of a new regime. In addition, commissioners, like 
most of us, are affected by the tides of public opinion. Still, 
sudden departures from previous policy are unlikely. 
Paradoxically, the downside of internal consistency 
within an independent agency can be government-wide 
inconsistency. Not one of these independent agencies has 
a national perspective, in that not one of them adds up the 
'These familiar acronyms identify the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC); the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)/Department of 
Health and Human Services; the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (0SHA)lDepartment of Labor; the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA); the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHA)/all three, 
Department of Transportation; and the Food Safety and Quality 
Service (FSQS)/Department of Agriculture. 
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sum of the individual actions to assess their total impact. 
Thus, we may find a government fraught with contradiction 
or disarray on the national level. The economic chaos that 
besets the nation today has not come from any single 
blunder. To the extent regulation is at fault, it is the cumula- 
tive result of many actions that are outside the direct con- 
trol of an elected President pledged to take strong correc- 
tive action. 
Expert Boards. Through non-political expert boards, in- 
dependence also seeks to foster informed decisions on 
technical matters that can have broad policy implications. 
Experts are chosen for their knowledge, credentials, and 
interest in the field. A President should carefully select- 
subject to considered Senate approval-the most quali- 
fied experts to render public service on these commis- 
sions. 
This ideal, however, is seldom achieved. Because the 
commissions are independent, their performance does not 
reflect directly on the President. Since they generally do 
not reflect negatively on the administration, presidents 
have been known to abuse the appointments process. 
Commission appointments in many cases have become 
political plums-jobs awarded for years of loyal service to 
a prominent public figure or to a political party. Political 
patronage, not merit, accounts for many of the appoint- 
ments to the independent commissions. 
WHITE HOUSE PURSE STRINGS 
Congress has given the Off ice of Management and Bud- 
get (OMB) vast discretion over the independent commis- 
sions' budgetary and personnel matters. As a result, the 
commissions are becoming much more susceptible to 
pressures from the administration-pressures subtle and 
not so subtle. 
The administration has come to exercise the power of 
the purse by setting the "mark" that every agency must 
support in going to the Congress for an appropriation. This 
gives OMB enormous influence with the independent com- 
missions. While Congress retains ultimate funding control, 
OMB sets the stage for, and the terms of, the debate. 
White House authority extends to other key areas. OMB 
can review, delay, or veto an independent agency's infor- 
mation requests to industry and thereby frustrate ongoing 
investigations. OMB sets agency personnel ceilings 
regardless of how much money Congress appropriates. 
Plus, at a moment's notice, OMB can freeze all hiring 
activities. Finally, although independent agencies for the 
most part are not subject to substantive Executive Orders, 
the pressures for "voluntary" compliance are intense. Con- 
gress often questions agencies about whether and how 
they are responding to such directives. The independent 
commissions have little recourse but to conform. 
CONGRESSIONAL TUGS AND PULLS 
Congress has been no less energetic than the President 
in asserting influence over the independent regulatory 
commissions. Holding ultimate control through its constitu- 
tional power of the purse, Congress can make the inde- 
pendent agencies hop, skip, or jump, on cue. Funds may 
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be slashed, or the reauthorization period may be short- 
ened to give added leverage. For example, the CPSC 
received a triple-blow during its 1981 reauthorization: 
wide-scale budget and personnel cutbacks (both down 
some 30% and a short two-year lease on life that may 
have to be renewed under still less favorable circum- 
stances. Nothing is more likely to make a bold agency timid 
and reluctant to use its statutory powers. 
Congress also does a lot of tugging and pulling through 
its oversight committees. The committees instruct agen- 
cies to investigate or cease investigating specific issues, 
and mince no words in telling an agency how to proceed. 
Finally, all the recent hue and cry about legislative veto 
signals Congress' changing attitude toward indepen- 
dence. The veto gives Congress a short-cut to summarily 
overrule an agency's decision. While Congress can 
already accomplish the same end through legislation, 
the veto injects Congressional influence earlier and more 
quickly. But when Congress decides to pass on agency 
rules even before they have had a trial run, agencies 
become gun-shy, and their coveted independence mean- 
ingless. 
TRADEOFFS 
Despite all these limits, the independent regulatory com- 
missions still enjoy a measure of autonomy. The President 
and Congress tend to shape the context-not the content 
-of regulatory decisions. The distinction is between what 
can be done now and what can be done over time. The 
President and Congress exert influence over budget, per- 
sonnel, and jurisdiction. But actual decisionmaking re- 
mains the exclusive domain of the commissioners. The 
nitty-gritty of regulating-who gets stuck, how badly, and 
for how long-usually lies beyond the immediate control of 
Congress and the President. 
Clearly, agency independence involves tradeoffs. For 
too long though it has survived by tradition alone. It is time 
to re-evaluate the entire concept of independence. To 
prevent the President from tackling large sectors of the 
economy that are regulated by a host of independent reg- 
ulatory commissions-established and preserved largely 
through historical accident-is self-defeating. The Presi- 
dent cannot today direct all the key players in the federal 
government to follow his lead. Unless some compelling 
reason dictates otherwise, the President should have suffi- 
cient authority to coordinate the activities of as many of the 
federal agencies as possible. 
These commissions represent a valuable means of re- 
lieving some of the political pressures in the decision- 
making of a representative government. But tradition and 
happenstance should not dictate that their independence 
be maintained. Some agencies that needed to be indepen- 
dent at an earlier time do not have that need today. The 
advent of watchdog media and public interest groups, 
widespread openness in agency decisionmaking, tough- 
ened conflict-of-interest laws, and increased judicial re- 
view may be more than enough to guard against favoritism 
or impropriety. We should reassess whether we still need 
so extensive a "fourth branch" of government. &B 
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temporary or permanent basis to relieve some of the over- 
crowding in our state and county institutions. 
In addition to this, the administration is looking at unused 
lands of the federal government to see whether these 
lands could be made available to state and local govern- 
ments for reasonable amounts of money so that they could 
be used as the sites of future construction of prison and jail 
facilities. 
A third area where the federal government has a role is 
in the support of local law enforcement where centralized 
facilities are important, such as in law enforcement training 
and education, as well as in research, and central statisti- 
cal activities. In this regard the federal government is ex- 
panding the facilities being made available to state and 
local governments. 
And finally, the federal government will increase its in- 
vestigation and prosecution of federal offenses that have 
an impact on local criminal activity, and particularly on 
street crime. The administration is worried, for example, 
about the possible advent of terrorism, about assassina- 
tion attempts, and about guns being used in street crimes. 
One way that the federal government can cooperate with 
local law enforcement is to be more vigorous in the en- 
forcement of federal firearm crimes so that, for example, 
the possession of firearms at airports, of which there are 
hundreds of known instances every year, can be effectively 
prosecuted by the federal government. 
These are some of the crime-related areas in which the 
federal government will be active. In addition, federal, state 
1 and local officials, as well as members of the bar, must 
1 cooperate to simplify and accelerate the process of adjudi- 
cation in order to enhance certainty and deterence in crimi- 
nal law. We must also stress individual responsibility, a 
greater respect for the law, for truth and for justice, not only 
through our official criminal justice system, but also in 
schools and in other institutions that shape values. We 
must carry out the axiom that only the law-abiding can 
hope to enjoy a lawful society. &4 
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costs? Would they encourage undesirable judicial intru- 
sions into policymaking? 
These are serious questions. But I am not persuaded 
they raise problems that warrant setting aside the oppor- 
tunity for trying a masters' system. First, the two-stage 
process is designed to protect litigants' rights. No doubt 
some freedom of action will nevertheless be lost. But re- 
spect for the rights of contending parties should not be the 
dominant theme of environmental decisionmaking. That 
the merits of the cases in question are heard at all is in 
large measure a consequence of relaxation of the rules 
restricting access to the courts, as a result of judicial deci- 
sions and environmental legislation. The justification for 
that relaxation is that better decisions will serve the public 
interest. It is not that corporations and environmental 
organizations will thereby be fairly treated. Second, en- 
vironmental controversies already run a long regulatory 
and appellate course. Time would be saved if the burden of 
educating judges about scientific and technical matters 
could be lightened. Properly organized, the masters' pro- 
ceedings should do just that. Third, stage one costs can be 
controlled in the normal fashion used for the participation 
of masters: by judicial allocation among the parties. Stage 
two costs should be provided for in judicial appropriations; 
the number of cases is small, and the resulting increase in 
the judicial budget will not be onerous. 
As to the danger of encouraging judicial policymaking, a 
reading of recent opinions-for example in cases involving 
OSHA's proposed one part per million benzene standard, 
EPA's phaseout of leaded gasoline, and the NRC's rule- 
making efforts with respect to nuclear waste disposal- 
makes clear that no defensible set of rules will exclude the 
judiciary from substantive review of regulatory decisions. 
Even the most conservative of courts have been forced to 
review technical matters more deeply than administrative 
law traditionally allows. The lesson of the environmental 
cases is that hybrid technical and legal questions demand 
special attention if judicial review is to be more than pro 
forma approval of agency actions or naive application of 
preexisting prejudices. 
It has been suggested that technological decisionmak- 
ing can be improved only by reforming the administrative 
agencies and bringing technical expertise properly to bear 
on outstanding problems. Internal regulatory reform, it is 
argued, will revitalize the cooperative relationships among 
judges, legislators and regulators envisioned during the 
New Deal. If that is the hope, regulatory history is not 
encouraging. To one who observes the heavy impact of 
the inertia of past policies on present environmental and 
economic regulation, skepticism about a cure of the regu- 
latory malaise via agency reforms seems the only justifi- 
able position. It remains to implement a hardheaded vision 
of what is required by a complex technological society: in- 
dependent decisionmaking institutions with skills, interests 
and powers adequate to face the problems upon whose 
solutions our collective future turns. &) 
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